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WOMEN MIGRANTS PLAY POSITIVE ROLE
Research into the experience of women migrants has debunked 
a number of myths about the stereotypical migrant. BELINDA DODSON found women migrants 
are generally older, better educated and 
responsible, law-abiding citizens who are driven to migrate for trading 
and retail activities that benefit South Africa and the source country. 
THERE are three dominant stereotypes of migration to South Africa from other Southern African countries. The first 
is the image of the long-standing system of migrant mine labour from countries like Lesotho and Mozambique. The 
second is of an uncontrolled invasion of unauthorized immigrants seeking a better life in post-apartheid South Africa. 
A third stereotype is that all migrants are young males. 
New research by the Southern African Migration Project (SAMP) calls the latter two stereotypes into question by 
examining the experiences of women migrants from five neighbouring states -- Lesotho, Mozambique, Zimbabwe, 
Botswana and Namibia. 
The research shows that the migration experiences of women differ in significant ways from that of men. This has 
important policy implications and shows up a number of shortcomings in current policy approaches to the migration 
issue.
The SAMP research leads to two inescapable conclusions. Firstly, the migration experience in Southern Africa is 
deeply and profoundly gendered. To a long-established tradition of male labour migration is being added a growing 
stream of female migrants who are coming to South Africa for a number of different reasons, social and economic. 
Secondly, the different motives and patterns of male and female migration arise out of fundamental social and 
economic forces in source and recipient countries. Any sound migration policy therefore has to go hand-in-hand with 
regional socio-economic development. 
Although women have a lower incidence of personal migration experience to South Africa compared to men, more 
than a third have been to South Africa (36% compared to 48% of men). Women migrants tend to be married, older and 
more educated than their male counterparts. 
The "typical" female migrant is married, between the ages of 25 and 44, and has completed at least some years of high 
school -- far removed from the common stereotype of the unskilled, illiterate, irresponsible, young, single, male 
migrant. 
Men and women migrate to South Africa for very different reasons. Men go primarily to work, whereas women are 
driven by a wide range of social and personal factors in addition to economic incentives. Women go to South Africa to 
buy food, medicine, clothing and school supplies; to sell handicrafts and other wares; and to visit friends and relations 
working there. Very few female respondents go to South Africa to work or look for work (3% compared to 24% of 
males). 
Women make more frequent and shorter visits than men do -- days or weeks rather than months or years. They are also 
more likely than men to migrate legally and to return home within the prescribed period. Gender differences in 
migration behaviour thus have clear gender-specific policy implications. 
Also significant for policy formulation is the nature of the decision-making process behind women's migration. 
Although women's migration cannot be seen merely as an adjunct to male migration, women's migration is still 
commonly tied to that of men, with many women travelling to South Africa for the express purpose of visiting male 
family members. Policy should thus be formulated in terms of partners, families and households rather than 
individuals. 
Gender differences extend into the social and economic behaviour of migrants, reflecting the different motivations and 
patterns of male and female migration. Men are more likely to have established personal relationships and social 
networks in South Africa. Women's migration experience is shaped more by the temporary and contingent social and 
economic interactions involved in trading and retail activity.
Few women migrants express any desire to acquire South African residence or citizenship, and even fewer wish to 
retire or be buried in South Africa. For both genders, but especially for women, there is thus little basis for the 
perception of hordes of would-be immigrants threatening to engulf the country. People in neighbouring countries are 
realistic rather than idealistic about life in South Africa and most, especially women, would prefer to stay where they 
are. 
Female migration is a response to difficult circumstances in their home countries, but it is a temporary expedient rather 
than a permanent relocation. Expanded job opportunities in the places they live in, social and economic upliftment and 
improved availability of goods and services would remove much of the motivation for female and male migration, 
serving to reunite divided households and allow men and women from Lesotho, Mozambique and Zimbabwe to 
remain at home where they wish to be. 
A number of gender-sensitive guidelines for policy on migration are suggested by the research findings. Firstly, female 
migrants are for the most part law-abiding, responsible, enterprising and resourceful, engaging in cross-border 
movement as a mechanism for their own and their families' betterment. Current migration policy, together with a host 
of entrenched social norms and practices, discriminates against women in all sorts of ways, limiting their life choices 
and restricting their physical and socio-economic mobility. Migration policy should be formulated not in terms of 
atomistic, genderless "people" but in terms of men and women with specific biological, legal and social relationships.
Secondly, one category of female migrant that should be actively encouraged is those women who come to South 
Africa for the purposes of trading and shopping. They certainly make a positive contribution to the South African 
economy, and while there are complaints that foreign informal-sector traders undercut their South African 
counterparts, this competition must surely be part of the movement towards freer trade in the Southern Africa 
Development Community region. 
Thirdly, in the formulation and drafting of policy and legislation, care must be taken to ensure that adopting gender-
neutral language does not serve unintentionally to discriminate against women. Gender-sensitive should not imply 
gender-blind. 
Finally, the pattern of "to-and-fro" migration practised by Southern African women could facilitate positive socio-
economic change in both places. Far from being a threat, many of these activities benefit the South African economy. 
Women's migration also provides benefits to their families and communities at home. Allowing women freer 
temporary access to South Africa would encourage the exchange of goods, services and ideas that constitute the very 
engine of development. There is little to suggest that a more open migration policy would result in an unmanageable 
influx of women (or men) into the country. Indeed female migration to South Africa could be a mechanism for 
reducing inequalities in the region, empowering women to become agents of development in their home countries and 
in South Africa. 
Dr Belinda Dodson, formerly of the University of Cape Town, 
is a research associate of the Southern African Migration Project.
THE BUSY LIFE OF A TRADER
MARY Moyo (not her real name) has a stall selling stone and wood carvings. She travels regularly to 
and from Zimbabwe and South Africa. Visa permitting she spends a month in both countries. She 
brings stone carvings and other curios and takes back a range of goods. The last time she went home 
she took "ironing boards, electric stoves, wines, and groceries". Mary canvasses customers for orders, 
"white people in Zimbabwe give me a list of things to bring." 
With her extra profits she buys goods like ironing boards and stoves for which there is a ready market 
in Zimbabwe. 
Mary started coming to South Africa in 1984 when she brought doilies and took back wine for white 
Zimbabweans. She had made her contacts with the white Zimbabwean community when she worked 
as a domestic worker. Although she started out by trading in doilies, she has since abandoned knitting 
and started a curio business two years ago.
She says that selling curios in Harare is not profitable as "there are not enough tourists in Zimbabwe" 
and because the cross-border trade "is part of my business".
Mary also has other interests. Some years ago she established a small poultry business with 100 to 
150 chickens at a time. She is working on building the chicken farm so that she does not have to 
travel to South Africa as often as she presently does. 
The curio business fluctuates with the tourist season but her earnings are about R1 000 per week. 
Usually she is able to take out about R3 000 worth of goods every time she goes back to Harare. 
Customs duties amount to about R300-R400 depending on the goods brought into South Africa and 
taken into Zimbabwe. Her living costs in South Africa, rent (she shares accommodation with friends), 
food and so on, amount to about R1 500 for three weeks. For someone with only a Standard 6 
education, Mary is acutely aware of the fluctuations in the rand/Zim dollar exchange rate as it affects 
her business.
Locating her trading activities in Cape Town adds extra costs in travel and time, but is preferable to 
trading in Durban which was not sufficiently profitable, and Johannesburg which is "too noisy". She 
works seven days a week; weekends at Green Point and weekdays in Claremont. 
The biggest problem faced by Mary, and many other women traders like her, is getting an appropriate 
visa. Sometimes she is only issued with a visa which is valid for a few days or a couple of weeks, 
making it difficult for viable cross-border trade.
But most irksome is that traders are issued with visitors' visas which theoretically do not allow them 
to trade. 
As Mary said: "What I want to ask, is they give us these visas and then they make us pay duties on 
these things when we bring them in. But when we are here they say we cannot sell them or trade. 
Why do they let us bring them and pay duty? If they want us to come on holiday they should just let 
us bring our handbags and that's it." 
Mary is aged between 35 and 40. She has seven children, six of whom are at school in Harare and 
who are cared for by her husband who is paralyzed and stays at home and her baby travels with her. 
She also contributes to the support of two sisters who are in Zimbabwe.
SILENT EPIDEMIC STRIKES FORMER MINERS
Research has shown dramatic levels of gold mining-related lung disease in the 
rural areas of the region and highlights the significant social costs borne 
by the traditional labour-supplying communities. ANNA TRAPIDO asks: 
What is the extent of the problem? Who is responsible? What can be done 
about it? She suggests that the cost of compensation should be 
shifted to the industry itself, which may prompt action to curb dust levels.
THE reef formations of the South African gold mines are characterized by exceptionally high silica 
content. Silica makes up 60-80% of virgin rock and approximately 30% is free silica -- with dust 
particles that are small enough to penetrate the alveolar region of the lungs and pose a health risk. The 
respiratory diseases associated with occupational exposure to silica in gold mining include simple 
chronic bronchitis, emphysema, chronic airways obstruction, tuberculosis and silicosis.
There can be a long latency period between exposure to risk factors on the mines and detectable 
occupational lung disease in mineworkers. As a result, former mineworkers can manifest 
occupational lung disease in the areas to which they return long after leaving mine employment.
Recent research is beginning to reveal the sheer scale and magnitude of the burden of mine-related 
occupational lung disease and physical disability in the rural areas. The studies all show the 
considerable, long-term medical, social and economic consequences of risks to health in the 
workplace.
Two recent surveys of the prevalence of occupational lung disease amongst a random sample of 
former gold mineworkers were conducted in the Kweneng district of Botswana and the Libode 
magisterial district, Eastern Cape Province. In Kweneng the overall prevalence of pneumoconiosis 
was 26 to 31%. Twenty six percent of the miners had a reported history of tuberculosis. In Libode, 
the prevalence of pneumoconiosis was 22 to 37%. Thirty three percent of the Libode miners had a 
reported history of tuberculosis.
Both studies were able to demonstrate that there is a statistically significant association between total 
length of service on the gold mines and pneumoconiosis. In addition, studies of the quality of life of 
mineworkers who have been permanently disabled by mine accidents describe a systematic transfer 
of the consequences of occupational injury to the communities from which the migrant workers 
originate.
If the results of the Botswana and Eastern Cape studies are replicated in other mine-sending areas (as 
one might fully expect them to be) there is a massive problem that cannot be avoided. The recent 
White Paper on Minerals and Mining Policy clearly recognizes that the burden of occupational health 
amongst former miners is a significant practical and developmental challenge.
Compensation for occupational lung disease in mineworkers is provided in terms of the South 
African Occupational Diseases in Mines and Works Act, (ODMWA) number 78 of 1973 (as amended 
by act number 205, 1993). The ODMWA is a "no fault" compensation system which makes provision 
for compensation for the following diseases: pneumoconiosis, pneumoconiosis with tuberculosis, 
permanent obstruction of airways, progressive systemic sclerosis and any other permanent cardio-
respiratory organs attributable to risk work.
RISK WORK
The ODMWA applies to all people who perform or who have performed risk work at a controlled 
mine or works in South Africa. There are over 450 controlled mines and works in South Africa (i.e. 
the majority of companies in the mining industry). Provision is made under the ODMWA for the 
level of risk in each controlled mine and works to be assessed by means of periodic dust sampling. 
The concentration of specific airborne particles is assessed and, on the basis of this assessment, a levy 
is raised from each employer. The levy enables the ODMWA Compensation Commissioner to pay 
compensation in respect of every person who performs risk work at or in connection with that mine or 
works and who is found to have a compensable disease.
All current and ex-miners are covered by the ODMWA regardless of citizenship. Not all disease is 
sufficiently severe to merit compensation. The ODMWA defines disability due to compensable 
disease in various ways. Compensation under ODMWA is wage based with payments equivalent to 
either 18 months or three years salary, depending on the severity of the disability.
The identification and compensation of occupational disease was racially-determined under apartheid. 
South Africa has had mining-related compensation legislation and a state run medical facility for 
occupational lung disease since 1916. However, access to this facility was reserved for white workers 
until the 1993 ODMWA. Excluded from the state's occupational disease surveillance systems at the 
Medical Bureau for Occupational Diseases (MBOD), black miners had to rely on mine doctors paid 
by mining companies for their occupational health surveillance. White ex-miners had lifelong access 
to the MBOD while their black counterparts had to rely on district surgeons to assess their health 
status. Compensation payments were also based on race and favoured whites over blacks.
There was, and continues to be, a low level of awareness of and compliance with the provisions of the 
ODMWA by rural health workers. The Libode study referred to above found that 26% are eligible for 
compensation for pneumoconiosis. Of those cases certified as eligible for compensation, 62% had no 
previous history of compensation, 35% had been previously compensated but their disease had 
progressed and they were entitled to additional compensation, and only 2% had been paid in full. 
The average payment for the less severe cases was R22,888, while more severe cases averaged 
R45,508. The researchers estimate that there is a liability of R6,775 million in unpaid compensation 
owing to living ex-mineworkers who are South African citizens. This liability rises to R9,678 million 
when one includes compensation owing to living ex-miners in neighbouring states.
In addition to the cost of unpaid compensation, there are the costs of occupational health care for 
current and former gold miners. Costs of occupational lung disease health care internalized by the 
mining industry include contributions to compensation fund, costs of medical surveillance and 
treatment for in-service workers, and costs relating to loss of output for men with occupational 
disease. The estimated annual cost is R344 million, or about 4-5% of the total wage bill.
Externalized costs of occupational lung disease fall to state health services and individual ex-
mineworkers, their families and their communities. Externalized costs of occupational lung disease 
for former mineworkers resident in South Africa alone are estimated at R186 million per annum. The 
total annual cost of gold mining-related occupational lung disease is therefore an estimated R530 
million. This represents fully 0.1% of South Africa's 1996 GDP and 2.6% of gold mining's 
contribution to GDP. There has as yet been no research into the externalized costs of occupational 
lung disease being borne by countries outside South Africa.
Bobby Godsell, Chief Executive of AngloGold, has stated that "South Africa may have to chose 
between requiring the industry to compensate for past injustices and protecting present jobs" 
implying that these positions are tradeable.
Setting compensation for occupational disease against preservation of jobs fails to recognize that the 
situation is not only a past problem but a current reality. The logical conclusion of approaching 
unpaid compensation and externalized costs in this way is that the burden of occupational disease 
amongst ex-workers and labour-sending communities should be written off as bad debt or treated as 
obsolete capital. If the gold mining industry does not accept liability for unpaid compensation and 
externalized costs who will? 
UNDIAGNOSED
The available research shows that there is a high prevalence of previously undiagnosed and 
uncompensated occupational lung disease in former mineworkers. Their rights under the ODMWA 
are hidden because many are unaware of their entitlement and health service providers have not 
recognized the realities of migrancy and disease latency.
The costs of externalizing the burden of occupational lung disease are extremely damaging for 
individuals, households and communities in labour-sending areas. In a context of low levels of 
education and high levels of dependency on physical labour as a source of employment, even a minor 
degree of disability can be a major impediment to future employment. 
Occupational lung disease can destroy a livelihood and result in a household becoming permanently 
poorer. It is inefficient for the country as a whole to take on the costs of mining-related occupational 
lung disease. Placing the cost of disease on the industry would almost certainly result in measures 
being taken to reduce dust levels with a consequent reduction in disease incidence and therefore a 
reduction in the costs to society of ex-miners.
Furthermore, redressing the unpaid compensation liability would result in a distribution of income, by 
legal entitlement, to one of the poorest sectors of the population, which would reduce societal 
inequalities.
Anna Trapido is with the Epidemiology Research Unit in Johannesburg.
MIGRANT LABOUR MUST END, 
SAYS WHITE PAPER
Jonathan Crush and Wilmot James
DEBATE on the White Paper on Minerals and Mining Policy has focused on who owns South 
Africa's mineral rights, to the exclusion of other policy issues. Chapter 3, for example, addresses 
various critical "people issues" including the thorny question of foreign migrant labour on the mines. 
Unfortunately, the White Paper's reflections on the future of labour migration remain ambiguous. 
The government, according to the White Paper, is to phase out migrant labour as well as allow non-
citizens access to the mine labour market "on an acceptable basis". The system will also apparently be 
reformed to protect the interests of migrant mineworkers and to manage the effects on neighbouring 
countries. Here the White Paper fails to take into account the recommendations of the Green Paper on 
International Migration, which has a great deal to say about these issues.
How the government can abolish migrant labour without wrecking the wealth-producing capacity of 
the mines has always been unclear. Incremental change seems to be the only way forward. In 1996, 
permanent residence was offered to all foreign miners who had worked in South Africa for at least 10 
years. More than 100,000 miners (and their families) could acquire permanent residence, a significant 
step in the phasing out of migrant labour.
Knowledge of the terms and conditions of this offer was very prevalent among miners from 
neighbouring states. However, they did not embrace the offer with any great enthusiasm. In most of 
the so-called supplier states -- such as Mozambique and Lesotho -- less than 50% of eligible miners 
applied. Why, if the migrant labour system is so iniquitous, did fewer than half of the miners accept 
the chance to step out of it? 
Two recent reports by the Southern African Migration Project (SAMP) -- based on extensive 
interviews with miners in Mozambique and Lesotho -- help answer the question. The minority who 
applied cited four main reasons for doing so: they could receive all their wages in South Africa; they 
could seek alternative work if they lost their jobs; they would be able to avoid harassment by the 
South African police; and they could purchase consumer goods on credit. Fewer than 10% wanted to 
move permanently and even fewer wanted to bring their families with them. 
Foreign miners hold overwhelmingly negative views of South Africa and very positive opinions of 
their home countries. Most Mozambicans could not bring themselves to mention any advantage -- 
other than a job -- of living in South Africa. What may surprise many South Africans, especially 
those who assume that all Mozambicans and Basotho cannot wait to move here, is that most simply 
do not care for the lifestyle that their comparatively rich neighbour offers.
Miners from Mozambique and Lesotho are, relatively speaking, an economic elite in their home 
districts. Most own land and have invested resources in livestock and agriculture. These provide 
powerful ties to home. Their affection for home is in no way diminished by the fact that they are 
migrants. What they want is to dip in and out of the South African labour market, which is what many 
have been doing successfully for decades. 
Ironically, the migrant labour system carries the seeds of its own perpetuation. A voluntary effort to 
phase out foreign labour on the mines was a resounding failure. The dilemma facing the South 
African government is as acute now as it was in 1994: resort to less voluntary methods to get rid of 
the migrant labour system or leave it alone, in which case the volume of foreign labour on the mines 
will remain sizeable and, in all likelihood, increase. 
The dilemma is as acute as ever and the White Paper provides little guidance on how to resolve it. 
The Green Paper on International Migration recommends maximum flexibility of choice, consistent 
with the Constitution and Bill of Rights, enabling migrant workers to get the full protection of 
International Labour Organization conventions and South African labour law. It specifically 
recommends that the government renegotiate the bilateral agreements that govern migration to restore 
dignity to those who work the mines.
In fact, to end migrant labour arbitrarily would ruin South Africa's neighbours and bring about 
unacceptable dislocation at the mines. To leave things as they are is simply wrong. What is required 
is a slow but deliberate phasing out of labour migration, by a strategic tinkering with the system, 
anticipating all of the consequences. Somebody ought to give some thought to what that strategy 
ought to be.
Dr Jonathan Crush and Dr Wilmot James are co-directors of the Southern African Migration 
Project, an Idasa/Queen's University partnership.
ASSISTED RETURNEES GOING HOME TO STAY
Since July last year the Refugee Research Programme (RRP) at Wits 
University has assisted more than 500 refugees in returning to Mozambique.
A Wits University research project has been instrumental in helping hundreds of Mozambicans 
return to their homeland. ACHIM RIZMANN reports. 
"It is better to work for yourselves than for a bag of mealiemeal." This statement sums up the opinion 
of many refugees who have chosen to return to Mozambique with the "Assisted Voluntary Return 
Pilot Project" of the Refugee Research Programme (RRP) and the Comite Eçumenico para a 
Desenvolvimento Social (CEDES-RRR).
More than 500 people have returned to Mozambique to farm again for themselves, something that 
was not possible in the densely populated former homeland areas of South Africa. They are a few of 
the 220,000-250,000 refugees that remained on South African soil five years after the end of the civil 
war in Mozambique, despite "the largest reparation exercise ever undertaken in Africa" by the United 
Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR). After the UNHCR operation and the signing of 
the Cessation Clause for refugee status in December 1996 these people are no longer officially 
recognized as refugees and are therefore particularly vulnerable, subject to exploitation in the labour 
market and other areas.
They return with hope but also anxiety to relatives and friends in a country they were forced to leave 
six to 15 years ago due to civil war. They hope to revive life in Mapulanguene, Mahele, Panjane and 
all the other villages in the areas bordering the Kruger Park.
RRP was approached by the refugees in 1996 while conducting research into the SADC amnesty in 
the Bushbuckridge area to assist them in transporting their household back to Mozambique.
A subsequent pilot study in three refugee settlements showed that approximately 25% wanted to 
repatriate. RRP lobbied for small-scale operations over a longer period of time involving both 
Mozambicans and South Africans, including former refugees, in transport and facilitation.
This was based on the low turnout of the UNHCR operation, where it became clear that, "yes I want 
to go back" in a survey does not necessarily mean "now". The final decision is based on complex 
socio-economic survival strategies.
The pilot project proposal was supported by the Association of West European Parliamentarians for 
Africa (AWEPA), who lobbied international funders. The Department of Home Affairs, Mpumalanga 
and Northern Province; the Mozambican Consulate, and the Nucleo de Apoio aos Refugiados (NAR) 
in Maputo, assisted the process. On the Mozambican side, CEDES/RRR supplied the reintegration 
support, consisting of seeds, tools and housing materials.
In the three projects carried out so far in July 1997, January 1998 and August 1998, RRP helped 574 
refugees to return to Mozambique.
Meanwhile RRP has monitored the reintegration of the returnees from the first two convoys to assess 
the success of an "assisted return" project. All returnees have settled in Mozambique and 90% said 
the return improved their spiritual and material well being. They obtained either their original land or 
preferred land nearby without any difficulties.
Of the 10% whose lives have not improved, some have returned to areas where the land is used for 
commercial agriculture by mainly South African farmers, making subsistence agriculture almost 
impossible. With no employment opportunities, many are thinking of returning to South Africa.
Others want to stay, but complain about the lack of schools and water in the areas they have returned 
to, a situation, which is being addressed by the Mozambican authorities and NGOs.
Assisted return is a viable possibility for many refugees who see Mozambique as the better option for 
their future. There will still be many more wanting to return as living conditions in Mozambique 
improve and feedback is given from those who have already settled in their home country.
STRATEGIES DEVELOPED AT
BOTSWANA TRAINING INSTITUTE 
THE International Training Programme in Population and Sustainable Development, based at the 
University of Botswana, was established in 1995 to help formulate and implement national 
development strategies based on interrelationships among the population, national resources, the 
environment and sustainable development.
First located at the Institute of Social Studies (ISS) in The Hague, the programme was brought to 
Botswana because of the country's widely acknowledged political stability, economic viability and 
policies of transparency and accountability - compared with other countries in sub-Saharan Africa.
The programme's immediate objectives include creating a team trained in the integration of 
population and sustainable development. It will also undertake appropriate and relevant research 
activities aimed at supporting training, as well as publish and disseminate outstanding teaching 
materials and research findings. The programme also aims to stimulate, encourage and support the 
establishment and strengthening of population and development training activities and units within 
the university and academic and training institutions elsewhere.
Mid-career government personnel and Non-Governmental Organization officers from developing 
countries, with diverse professional backgrounds in population and sustainable development, are also 
being trained by the programme. 
"Our students are chosen through their national governments who nominate them for United Nations 
fellowships," says programme co-ordinator Professor John Oucho. 
Previously director of the Population Studies and Research Institute of the University of Nairobi, 
where he was also professor of demography and population studies, Oucho finds his position with the 
programme challenging. However, he is concerned that "our students, given their backgrounds and 
work experiences, can hardly cope with rigorous academic pursuits". 
INTERNATIONAL CENTRES
The programme has five international centres -- in Cairo (Egypt), Rabat (Morocco), Trivandrum 
(India), Santiago (Peru) and Gaborone (Botswana).
It has considerable scope for training and research and for catalyzing population and sustainable 
development activities in Southern Africa. For example, the services of the programme have been 
enlisted for the short-term training of Southern African researchers, planners and programme 
implementers in the field of population, food and the environment.
"The future of the programme is bright," says Oucho.
ARCHAIC LABOUR AGREEMENTS NEED 
ATTENTION
The bilateral labour treaties between South Africa and its 
neighbouring states benefit the countries but not the 
migrant workers. CLARENCE TSHITEREKE reports. 
THE employment contracts of citizens from South Africa's neighbouring states to work on the mines 
are governed by inter-governmental agreements, also known as the Bilateral Labour Treaties. 
Currently, such agreements exist between South Africa and Botswana (1973), Lesotho (1973), 
Malawi (1967), Mozambique (1964) and Swaziland (1975). These bilateral agreements are the 
subject of heated discussion between players within the mining industry and in terms of South 
African immigration policy in general. Forms a key part in the debate about South Africa's two gates 
system of admitting people to the country.
The Aliens Control Act controls the entry of skilled people in general. The bilaterals are specifically 
designed to enable citizens from the neighbouring states to work as contract labourers on the mines. 
Under the Aliens Control Act, a foreigner who has a skill needed by South Africa may apply for and 
obtain a temporary work permit or permanent residence. If granted permanent residence, he or she 
may apply after five years for South African citizenship. Such persons are also entitled to bring 
members of their family into the republic and have access to schools, medical care and other social 
and welfare services. 
The raison d'etre of the original agreements was to curb undesirable permanent immigration of 
unskilled black people from the neighbouring countries and elsewhere. Those admitted under the 
bilateral labour treaties are employed on a contract basis and have to return home when their 
contracts expire. The contracts are renewable on a 12- or 18-month basis. As a consequence of the 
temporary nature of their contracts, they can never acquire permanent residence, irrespective of the 
total length of time they have worked in South Africa.
Although the Chamber of Mines is adamant that their workers are now 
permanent employees, the bilaterals prevent miners from accessing the
benefits and freedoms of such states.
Contract mineworkers are also not allowed to bring their families with them. A particularly 
controversial aspect of the bilateral agreements is the stipulation that 30-60% of their salaries be 
deferred to their home countries on a monthly basis. Attempts to terminate this system have failed 
dismally, partly because the system is reinforced by the bilaterals and as such can be repealed only by 
the governments concerned and not the unions. Complicating the issue further is the reluctance of the 
sending countries to repeal or terminate these agreements. This has prevented a convincing argument 
in favour of repealing the agreements to the South African government.
Reluctance on the part of the sending countries is understandable on the grounds that the deferred pay 
of mineworkers in South Africa represents a significant portion of their much-needed foreign 
exchange earnings and, unlike loans from the IMF and the World Bank, does not have to paid back. 
Since the establishment of the National Union of Mineworkers (NUM) in 1982, some of the 
provisions in the bilaterals are no longer observed. They have to a large extent been superceded by 
union agreements with the mining industry, including the terms of employment of migrant workers. 
The bilaterals still regard them as temporary employees.
Although the Chamber of Mines is adamant that their workers are now permanent employees, the 
bilaterals prevent miners from accessing the benefits and freedoms of such status. The bilaterals 
reinforce the contract migrant labour system to the mines, which is mutually advantageous to the 
sending countries and South Africa. The sending states benefit from remittances and South Africa 
from much-needed additions to its labour force. Secondly, the sending states export a barren pool of 
their population (with enormous human potential) that would otherwise remain unemployed. Finally, 
South Africa benefits from having at its disposal labour reserve for which it is only responsible for 
the duration of their contracts. Instead of bargaining to repeal the bilaterals, most governments have 
given South African mining recruiting agencies a stamp of approval to recruit as many of their 
nationals as possible. The logic is simple; the more people contracted from a particular country, the 
higher the remittance package. 
The Labour Market Commission, the Draft Green Paper on International Migration, the South 
African Department of Labour and the NUM have called for the bilaterals to be scrapped. They argue 
that: the agreements are obsolete; they do not conform in many respects to International Labour 
Office (ILO) norms and standards; they are not applied uniformly; they are discriminatory on the 
basis of colour and skill and that the system of compulsory deferred pay prevents miners from 
enjoying maximum benefits of their toil and that this undermines basic human rights; they give 
special privileges to certain South African employers which should be enjoyed by all. 
On the whole, then, the provisions of the bilateral agreements are inconsistent with the values 
enshrined in South Africa's Constitution and Bill of Rights, and either need to be scrapped or revised 
in a substantial manner. Let the negotiations begin.
Clarence Tshikireke is programme co-ordinator with SAMP.
COURTS TAKE A STAND 
AGAINST HOME AFFAIRS
JONATHAN KLAAREN explains how the judicial system has the potential 
to safeguard the rights of foreign nationals in South Africa who struggle 
for legitimacy in their adopted country.
COURTS are notoriously bad at social reform. Legislatures and executive departments can set up the 
proper institutions to get the job done, but courts cannot really design policy responses to fast-moving 
and complex issues.
What courts can do, however, is point out when the political and legislative process has stalled or 
gone wrong. Even the most ardent South African supporters of majoritarian democracy would allow 
the judiciary the power to safeguard individual rights. In addition, by safeguarding individual rights, 
the courts have an important role to play in signaling a warning, so that the political process can be 
alerted to its failings. 
President Arthur Chaskalson of the Constitutional Court said in S v Makwanyane: "The very reason 
for establishing the new legal order, and for vesting the power of judicial review of all legislation in 
the courts, was to protect the rights of minorities and others who cannot protect their rights 
adequately through the democratic process. 
"Those who are entitled to claim this protection include the social outcasts and marginalized people 
of our society. It is only if there is a willingness to protect the worst and weakest among us that all of 
us can be secure that our own rights will be protected."
Migration policy in South Africa could be a textbook example of this role for the courts. The courts 
are faced with a political process that is, at the least, stalled and that is arguably failing to protect 
human rights and promote the growth of the South African economy. While their response is not 
comprehensive or systematic (which is the job of the legislature), individual courts are responding.
Indeed, the Department of Home Affairs has suffered a number of high-profile defeats in South 
African courts over the past six months.
On 20 May 1998, in Handmaker and Another v Minister of Home Affairs, civil society prevailed. 
Here the department refused to extend the work permits of two non-South Africans who were 
working in the area of refugee law and policy and who were training a South African to take over that 
task. However, the court found that it would not be fair to expel the two workers while an application 
for review to the Minister of Home Affairs was pending. The fact that a foreigner was able to rely on 
the Bill of Rights, including the right of administrative justice, was specifically noted by the judge.
The following day it was the turn of the media. In Kasiyamhuru v Minister of Home Affairs, the 
department attempted to revoke the equivalent of permanent residence for the wife of a journalist who 
had been outspoken in his criticism of the government. The attempt failed largely because the 
department was unable to produce clear documentation of the delegated administrative authority of 
the official who took the decision. The journalist's wife was able to stay in the country.
The most recent case was one decided in Durban on 16 October 1998 in a matter brought by the 
Legal Resources Centre. In Tettey v Minister of Home Affairs, a Ghanaian citizen entered the country 
illegally and obtained papers fraudulently. However, he soon turned himself in to the Department of 
Home Affairs. Officials there promised to regularize his status if he assisted them in their 
investigations into those who provided him with illegal papers. Three years after he had given 
evidence on its behalf, the department attempted to remove Tettey. In part, the department argued that 
"an alien who applied for residence within the republic has no rights, interests, or legitimate 
expectations that are affected by a decision to refuse to issue a permit".
The court rejected this argument and found the departmental promise gave rise to a protected 
legitimate expectation. As the court stated, "there is nothing in the Constitution to indicate that an 
alien is not entitled to procedurally fair administrative action". The court ordered that the department 
could not deport Tettey pending the outcome of further proceedings. The case is significant for 
overturning the line of reasoning that an alien had no constitutional rights worthy of protection.
One of the interesting aspects of these high-profile defeats for the department is that these cases are 
not those of refugees. In that policy area, the department has engaged legislatively with the issues. 
This year, after a white paper process, Home Affairs passed the Refugees Act. Even here there have 
still been some important recent court actions brought by refugee rights advocates. For instance, the 
Cape Town Legal Resources Centre has at least temporarily succeeded in getting the government to 
agree not to deport asylum applicants whose section 41 permits have expired.
However, most of the above high-profile cases concern immigration not refugee policy. Here, the 
department has a huge hole in terms of legislation. There are, of course, some cases going the other 
way. For instance, in a case involving a Tai citizen, the court reasoned that a wife's right of residence 
in the republic did not include a right to have her husband, who had no immigration status, to stay 
with her. It also ruled in the department's favour on a number of other points. While moved by the 
applicant's plight, the court more or less accepted Home Affairs' migration policy. On the whole, and 
especially where fairness is in issue (unlike in the Tai case), Home Affairs is being hammered in the 
courts.
Indeed, it should be noted that the legal decisions going against the department are mostly 
technicalities. The department is losing because it is having trouble getting its administration correct. 
What this means is that issues of principle and matters of immigration policy are rarely addressed. 
The department is losing on procedural and technical grounds, but the courts have not yet got to the 
substantive policy debate.
Looking at a number of court actions pending, that substantive policy debate may soon be entering 
the courts. The National Coalition for Gay and Lesbian Equality v Minister of Home Affairs case 
raises the issue of the constitutionality of the newly instituted departmental practice of treating 
applications for permanent residence by same-sex partners of South African citizens less favourably 
than the applications of married couples. In Dawood v Minister of Home Affairs, the issue is whether 
it is constitutionally reasonable for the department to charge persons married to South African 
citizens the usual fee (presently R7 750) for an application for permanent residence. In both cases, 
pending court action, the applicants are relying on the provisions of the Bill of Rights to have the 
courts declare either administrative actions or sections of the Aliens Control Act unconstitutional.
Whether procedural or substantive, these judicial losses pose a danger for the Department of Home 
Affairs. This department can either proactively construct a legislative response to the problems of 
administration and policy that the courts are identifying or the department can have policy changes 
thrust on it by the judges. Policy can be made by declaring administrative actions and laws 
unconstitutional or policy can be made rationally and progressively. The department must decide.
Jonathan Klaaren, a law lecturer at the University of the Witwatersrand,
is an associate of the Constitutional Litigation Project of the university's Centre for 
Applied Legal Studies. He is also completing his PhD in sociology at Yale University.
LAUNCH OF ANTI-XENOPHOBIA CAMPAIGN
In an attempt to combat what appears to be a growing and very troubling increase in xenophobia in 
South Africa, the National Consortium on Refugee Affairs hosted a workshop on 18 November in 
Johannesburg to plan a "Roll Back Xenophobia" public education campaign. The campaign will be 
launched on 10 December 1998, which coincides with the 50th anniversary of the United Nations 
Declaration of Human Rights.
Representatives from organized labour, the media, non-governmental organizations, universities, 
embassies and the unemployed were among the more than 70 people who attended the workshop. The 
National Consortium on Refugee Affairs chairperson, Jody Kollapen, opened the discussions by 
saying that South Africa needs to send out a strong message that irrational prejudice and hostility 
toward non-nationals is unacceptable. 
This message was followed by a summary of findings from a recent national survey of South 
Africans by David McDonald of the Southern African Migration Project (SAMP). It concluded that a 
large majority of South Africans are indeed anti-immigrant and xenophobic -- but that there are 
grounds for optimism and positive change.
The workshop then broke up into working groups to develop educational "plans of action" for those 
groups deemed most critical to an anti-xenophobia campaign. The plight of foreign workers (in the 
informal and formal sectors) and that of refugees and asylum seekers was deemed to require special 
treatment - by way of an education campaign. 
The same applied to the treatment of foreign nationals by police and civil servants and the role that 
has been played by the media and educators. 
The December campaign launch will be the start of a much longer-term initiative to address and 
understand xenophobia. SAMP will have significant input in this process.
